

Message Text

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EXDIS

FOL RPT CAIRO 12461 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO JIDDA, KHARTOUM,
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QUOTE: S E C R E T CAIRO 12461

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, SO -
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH SOMALI PRESIDENT
- SIAD BARRE

REF: (A) CAIRO 12321 (NOTAL), (B) STATE 116104 (NOTAL)
SUMMARY: AT SADAT'S REQUEST, I MET FOR HALF AN HOUR THIS
MORNING WITH SOMALI PRESIDENT TO HEAR LATTER'S "ANALYSIS"
OF SOVIET INTENTIONS. THRUST OF SIAD'S ARGUMENT, WHICH
HAS DOUBTLESS ALREADY BEEN FULLY REPORTED BY
MOGADISCIO, WAS THAT USG NOT SUFFICIENTLY MINDFUL OF
SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. WHEREAS SOVIETS ACT
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DECISIVELY, AND OVERAWE PEOPLE, USG STILL SUFFERS FROM
VIETNAM COMPLEX AND REACTS SLUGGISHLY. OVERTHROW OF
DJIBOUTI REGIME BY PRO-COMMIE ELEMENTS SIMPLY QUESTION
OF MONTHS. PUPPET REGIME WILL BE INSTALLED AND COMMAND
BAB AL-MANDAB. FRENCH ROLE PUZZLED HIM. SIMILAR SOVIET
PLANS EXIST AGAINST OMAN, NORTH YEMEN, KENYA, SUDAN AND
EVENTUALLY EGYPT, WITH HELP OF LIBYA AND A RADICAL
SUDANESE GOVT. UNDERGROUND COMMIE ELEMENTS IN SUDAN
CAN EASILY OVERTHROW NUMAYRI. MOREOVER, "COMMUNIST
PSYCHOLOGICAL PENETRATION" TAKING PLACE IN KENYA. IN

FACE OF THESE THREATS, SOMALIA FEELS SURROUNDED. HE HAD SEVERED EIGHTEEN-YEAR ASSOCIATION WITH SOVIETS BECAUSE SOMALIA UNABLE AGREE WITH THEIR "DIABOLIC PLANS" FOR AREA. SOVIETS HAD THEN SHIFTED TO ETHIOPIA, WHICH STRATEGICALLY LOCATED TO FACILITATE ADVANCE INTO CENTRAL AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST. SIAD URGED THAT USG TAKE STRONG AND CLEAR STAND AGAINST SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND THAT PRESIDENT CARTER MAKE FIRM STATEMENT TELLING SOVIETS THEY MUST STOP. USG HAS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE TO IT THAT ITS FRIENDS IN AFRICA ARE NOT ABANDONED. I ASSURED HIM USG GENUINELY DESIRES GOOD RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA AND THAT BOTH SIDES HONOR RESPECTIVE ENGAGEMENTS. SUSPECT THAT SADAT IS IMPRESSED WITH SIAD'S ANALYSIS AND THAT WE MAY HEAR MORE FROM EGYPTIANS ABOUT PERCEIVED USG INATTENTION TO SOVIET STRATEGY IN AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

1. WHEN I CAME HOME LAST EVENING THERE WAS A MESSAGE FROM DCM THAT FONMIN KAMEL'S CHEF DE CABINET HAD TELEPHONED TO SAY THAT PRESIDENT SADAT WOULD LIKE ME TO MEET WITH VISITING SOMALI PRESIDENT SIAD.BARRE BEFORE LATTER'S DEPARTURE TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM HIM HIS ANALYSIS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE HORN. I SHOULD CALL VP MUBARAK TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS. WHEN I
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FINALLY MANAGED TO GET MUBARAK, I TOLD HIM I WOULD BE PLEASED TO COMPLY WITH PRESIDENT SADAT'S WISHES, BUT I WAS ALSO SURE THAT ANYTHING SIAD MIGHT SAY TO ME HAD ALREADY BEEN SAID TO MY DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE IN MOGADISCIO, AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN, AND HAD BEEN FULLY REPORTED BY HIM. MUBARAK SAID HE RECOGNIZED THIS, BUT OBSERVED THAT SADAT FELT STRONGLY THAT I SHOULD MEET WITH SIAD. HE NOTED SIAD WOULD ARRIVE AT CAIRO AIRPORT SHORTLY BEFORE 9:00 A.M. TAKE-OFF FOR RIYADH AND SUGGESTED THAT MIGHT BE BEST OPPORTUNITY FOR TALK. ACCORDINGLY, I TROOPED OUT TO THE AIRPORT THIS MORNING FOR MEETING IN PRESIDENTIAL LOUNGE. MUBARAK ARRANGED IT SO THAT SIAD AND I WERE ALONE. MEETING LASTED ABOUT A HALF HOUR. SUBSTANCE OF SIAD'S COMMENTS, WHICH HAVE DOUBTLESS BEEN REPORTED MANY TIMES BY AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN, IS SET FORTH BELOW.

2. SIAD EXPLAINED THAT SADAT HAD ASKED HIM TO SPEAK DIRECTLY TO ME. HE HAD POINTED OUT TO SADAT THAT EVERYTHING HE HAD RELATED HAD ALREADY BEEN SAID TO AMBASSADOR LOUGHRAN, BUT SADAT HAD INSISTED. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, SIAD SAID, HE HAD NO OBJECTION. SIAD NOTED THAT SADAT HAS GREAT CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE. IN HIS TALK WITH SADAT, THERE HAD BEEN CRITICISM OF U.S., NOT--AS HE PUT IT--IN A BAD SENSE, BUT SIMPLY BECAUSE USG MOVES SO SLOWLY AND IS RELUCTANT TO ACT WHEN THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION. SOVIETS KNOW THAT THE COMBINATION OF THE USG EXECUTIVE, THE CONGRESS, AND

THE "SYSTEM" ACCOUNTS FOR SLOW U.S. RESPONSES. ONE JOURNALIST WRITES "SMALL THINGS" AND EVERYONE IS SHOCKED AND EVERYTHING STOPS. IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS WITH THEIR TWELVE MAN POLITBURO MAKE A DECISION AND FOLLOW IT UP IMMEDIATELY. SOVIETS, SIAD SAID, ARE CURRENTLY IN AN AGGRESSIVE MODE. THEIR ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA POSE DANGERS FOR ALL. PRESIDENT CARTER IS A MAN OF PRINCIPLE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PEACE. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, THE AMERICANS REMAIN HYPNOTIZED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIETNAM.

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3. AFTER THE SOVIETS WON THE ANGOLA BATTLE, SIAD CONTINUED, THEY DECIDED THEY MUST BE MORE DYNAMIC AND TOUGH IN ADVANCING COMMUNIST PENETRATION IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY REALIZE THAT THROUGH SUCH ACTIVE MOVES, SOVIET PRESTIGE IN THE AREA WOULD RISE. IN CONTRAST, THE PRESTIGE OF THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IS GOING DOWN. MANY AFRICANS AND ARABS ARE SAYING THEY DO NOT WANT THE SOVIETS, BUT ALSO HAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT ANYONE WILL HELP THEM TO KEEP THEM OUT. OR, IF SOMEONE FINALLY COMES TO HELP, IT IS TOO LATE. THEREFORE, THEY CONSIDER IT IMPRUDENT TO CRITICIZE THE SOVIETS. HE, SIAD, HAD SAID TO SADAT THAT SINCE THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT IS SO CLOSE TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE, WHY DID SADAT NOT URGE THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION TO BE MORE DYNAMIC IN AFRICA BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.

4. THE OVERTHROW OF THE DJIBOUTI REGIME BY PRO-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, SIAD INSISTED, IS SIMPLY A QUESTION OF MONTHS. WHEN IT HAPPENS, THE SOVIET HAND WILL NOT BE VISIBLE, BUT WE SHOULD BE UNDER NO ILLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE. THEY WILL PUT IN A PUPPET REGIME AND COMMAND THE BAB AL-MANDAB. IN THIS CONNECTION, SIAD WONDERED ABOUT THE ROLE OF FRANCE. IT HAS MILITARY FORCES IN DJIBOUTI AND IS OBLIGATED TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY. HE COULD NOT CONVINCE HIMSELF, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE IS NOT AWARE OF THE PLOTTING AGAINST THE DJIBOUTI REGIME OF PRESIDENT GOULAD AND THE INTENTION TO INSTALL "STOOGES" ELEMENTS.

5. SOVIET PLANS ALSO EXIST AGAINST OMAN, NORTH YEMEN, KENYA, SUDAN AND EVENTUALLY AGAINST EGYPT WITH THE HELP OF LIBYA AND A RADICAL SUDANESE GOVT. SIAD SAID HE

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KNEW THERE ARE NUMEROUS COMMUNISTS UNDERGROUND IN THE SUDAN WHO CAN OVERTHROW NUMAYRI. SIMILARLY, WHEN THE OMANI REGIME FALLS, WHAT ABOUT THE GULF? WITH SOVIET CONTROL OF NORTH YEMEN AND DJIBOUTI, SIAD THOUGHT THE SAUDI REGIME WOULD BE SERIOUSLY WEAKENED. ADDITIONALLY, HE

CONTINUED, SOMALIA IS ALARMED AT THE "COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL PENETRATION OF KENYA." KENYA AND ETHIOPIA, HE NOTED, ARE BECOMING CLOSER AND CLOSER. THE SOMALI GOVT, HE CLAIMED, KNOWS WHAT IS TAKING PLACE UNDERGROUND IN KENYA. KENYATTA IS A NATIONALIST IN THE PUBLIC EYE. YET OTHER KENYAN LEADERS ARE ANTI-SOMALIA AND PRO-ETHIOPIA AND PRO-KREMLIN. SOMALIS KNOW THERE ARE YOUNG KENYAN OFFICERS AND STUDENTS PLOTTING TO OVERTHROW THE MODERATE KENYAN REGIME. THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY "WORKER ELEMENTS" AND TRIBES, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF ODINGA-ODINGA (WHO ARE ANTI-KIKUYU) AND ARE BEING ENCOURAGED BY THE SOVIETS. HE WONDERED WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN TO KENYA.

6. THE ISSUE IS NOT, SIAD WENT ON, THAT USG WANTS SOMALIA TO MAKE A DECLARATION OF NON-AGGRESSION AGAINST KENYA AND ETHIOPIA. THE BORDERS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA ARE A COLONIAL LEGACY AND HE ALLUDED TO THE 1964 OAU DECISION NOT TO CHANGE THEM BY FORCE. THIS, HE SAID, IS NO PROBLEM FOR SOMALIA. SOMALIA'S WORRY IS THAT ETHIOPIA IS NOW UNDER SOVIET TUTELAGE AND HAS HOSTILE AMBITIONS AGAINST DJIBOUTI. GIVEN THE DEVELOPMENTS THAT SIAD SEES DOWN THE ROAD, HE NOTED THAT SOMALIA CONSIDERS ITSELF SURROUNDED. HE WONDERED WHY THE WEST DOES NOT SHOW MORE CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFRICA WHEN THEY COULD BE STOPPED NOW.

7. SIAD THEN RELATED HIS OWN PAST ASSOCIATION WITH THE SOVIETS. SOME HAD SUGGESTED PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THAT ASSOCIATION WAS TO SUPPORT WESTERN SOMALIA AGAINST ETHIOPIA. THIS WAS WRONG. SOMALIS HAD BEEN UNABLE AGREE WITH SOVIETS ON THEIR "DIABOLIC PLANS" FOR THE AREA.
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HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT SOMALIA WILL NOT GIVE UP ITS SOVEREIGNTY. SOMALIA WISHED TO BE AN EFFECTIVE FRIEND. IT WOULD NOT BE LED AROUND BY THE SOVIETS. SOMALIA HAS AFRICAN, ARAB AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES. SOMALIA'S INSISTENCE ON THESE WAS THE BASIC REASON FOR THE DISAGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS AFTER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF ASSOCIATION WITH THEM. SOVIETS HAD THEN SHIFTED TO ETHIOPIA.

8. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ETHIOPIA IS STRATEGICALLY LOCATED. FROM THERE SOVIETS CAN HOPE TO ADVANCE INTO CENTRAL AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT SOMALIA CONDEMNS ANY SUCH PLANS. HE ASSUMED THAT AT SOME TIME THE WEST, LED BY THE U.S., WOULD BECOME MORE AWARE OF SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW MODERATE REGIMES. THE WEST MAY BE SLOW, BUT IT HAS SHOWN THAT WHEN IT DECIDES TO ACT IT CAN DO SO FORCEFULLY. BUT IF SUCH REACTION IS DELAYED TOO LONG, HE ARGUED, IT COULD MEAN THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR III. SOMALIS WANT TO LIVE IN PEACE IN THE AREA. THEY DO NOT WANT TROUBLE. IF THE SUPER-POWERS DID NOT INTERVENE,

SKIRMISHES BETWEEN AFRICAN STATES WOULD BE MINOR AND COULD BE EASILY HANDLED.

9. USG, SIAD URGED, SHOULD TAKE VERY STRONG AND CLEAR STAND AGAINST SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. THE SOVIETS, HE WAS SURE, DO NOT WANT A CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. ALL IT WOULD TAKE IS A FIRM STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER TELLING THE SOVIETS THEY MUST STOP. A PROMPT STATEMENT TO THIS EFFECT WOULD ALSO RAISE THE MORALE OF USG'S FRIENDS IN AFRICA. AS FOR SOMALIA, HE HAD TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE THAT USG SHOULD (A) ASSIST SOMALIA POLITICALLY AND DIPLOMATICALLY AND (B) PROVIDE SOMALIA WITH MEANS TO DEFEND ITSELF.

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10. SOMALIA KNOWS SOVIET PLANS IN AFRICA. USG SHOULD FIRMLY SPEAK UP AGAINST THEM BEFORE THEY ARE LAUNCHED. USG, AS HE SAW IT, HAS AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DO SO. USG FRIENDS IN AFRICA SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED. HE HOPED USG WILL WEIGH CAREFULLY HIS WORDS AND ACT MORE DECISIVELY THAN IT HAS HERETOFORE.

11. I ASSURED SIAD THAT I WOULD REPORT HIS COMMENTS. I THOUGHT HE COULD BE ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT USG GENUINELY DESIRES GOOD RELATIONS WITH SOMALIA. AS I UNDERSTOOD IT, WE HAVE AGREED TO PROVIDE SOME DEFENSIVE WEAPONS. AS HE KNEW, USG HONORS ITS COMMITMENTS, BUT WE ALSO COUNT UPON SOMALIA TO HONOR ITS PLEDGES TO US. WE WERE AWARE OF SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA AND, WHILE OUR RESPECTIVE ASSESSMENTS MIGHT NOT ALWAYS BE THE SAME, WE ARE NO LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THEM. I HOPED THAT THE EVOLVING U.S.-SOMALIA DIALOGUE WILL PROVIDE EACH SIDE WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERNS OF THE OTHER AND EVENTUALLY NARROW THE GAP IN OUR ESTIMATES.

12. COMMENT: THE FACT THAT SADAT ASKED THAT I HEAR SIAD'S "ANALYSIS" DIRECTLY FROM HIM INDICATES THAT THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT TAKES SERIOUSLY THE SOMALI ASSESSMENT. IT IS, OF COURSE, CONSISTENT WITH CONCERNS THAT SADAT HIMSELF HAS VOICED FOR PAST YEAR OR MORE. WE MAY EXPECT MORE EGYPTIAN DEMARCHES CALLING ON US TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS GRAND SOVIET DESIGN TO DOMINATE AFRICA. EILTS UNQUOTE VANCE

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